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CRIMINAL LAW
THE COURT'S "TWO MODEL"
APPROACH TO THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT: CARPE DIEM!
CRAIG M. BRADLEY*
A traveller, lost in a strange city, can occasionally make three
wrong turns and find himself on, if not necessarily the right road, at
least one that is going in the right direction. Similarly, the United
States Supreme Court, lost in the strange city of Fourth Amendment
law,' has taken three wrong turns, but may yet find itself on a road
that, if not "right," in terms of the Court's precedents, is logically
defensible and will lead to a much more straightforward rule for po-
lice. However, like the traveller, if the Court fails to recognize what
it has done, it will be doomed to continue its wayward course.
The three wrong turns that the Court has taken are United States
v. Robinson2 (a'warrantless search incident to any custodial arrest
may be a "full body search," including a search of any containers in
the suspect's possession), New York v. Belton 3 (a warrantless search
incident to arrest of an occupant of an automobile extends to all
containers in the passenger compartment), and California v. Acevedo4
* Professor of Law and Ira Batman Faculty Fellow, Indiana University (Blooming-
ton) School of Law. I wish to thank ProfessorJoseph Hoffmann of Indiana and Profes-
sor James Tomkovicz of Iowa for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
article.
1 I once termed the Fourth Amendment "'the Supreme Court's tarbaby'; a mass of
contradictions and obscurities that has ensnared the 'Brethren' in such a way that every
effort to extract themselves only leaves them more profoundly stuck." Craig M. Bradley,
Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1468 (1985). As this Article went to
press, two more articles heaping scorn on the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
have appeared. See James Adams, Search and Seizure as seen by Supreme Court Justices: Are
They Serious or is this Just Judicial Humor?, 12 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 413 (1993); Akhil
Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REv. 757 (1994).
2 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
3 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
4 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991).
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(warrantless automobile searches may extend to all containers
found in the automobile searched).
This Article will discuss why these three cases were wrongly de-
cided according to the Court's logic and precedents. That is, they
are flatly inconsistent with the Court's oft-advanced claim that
search warrants are ordinarily "required" subject to a "few specifi-
cally established and well-delineated exceptions." 5 It will further
consider how these decisions will lead (indeed, largely have led) to
the complete abandonment of the search warrant requirement for
all searches conducted out of doors and will lead to the establish-
ment of a "two model" approach to the Fourth Amendment, with
warrants required for searches of structures, but not of other places.
It will conclude with a model statute that will capture this new devel-
opment in a succinct and comprehensible form.6 This formulation
will demonstrate that the Court has, apparently through inadver-
tence, presented itself with a golden opportunity to render Fourth
Amendment law clearer and more straightforward than at any time
since the "criminal procedure revolution" began.7
I. THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT ABANDONED
A. UNITED STATES V. ROBINSON 8
In Robinson, the Court's first incorrect decision, a policeman
spotted a man, whose driver's license he knew to have been revoked,
driving a car.9 The policeman stopped the car and placed the driver
under arrest.' 0 The officer then searched the driver incident to the
arrest and felt an unknown object in the driver's breast pocket.'1
5 Id. at 1991.
6 In CRAIG M. BRADLEY, THE FAILURE OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REVOLUTION
(1993), 1 argue that statutes rather than case law should be the means by which criminal
procedure rules are promulgated. Supreme Court decisions, limited by the fact situa-
tion in the case before the Court, by stare decisis and by other factors, are inherently
unsuited for declaring rules for police to follow. Such rules must be stated succinctly,
not in a series of 30 to 40 page opinions, and must attempt to anticipate problems in
advance, rather than being limited to a particular case before the Court. The United
States is the only country to declare its criminal procedure rules in cases rather than
through a code. Id. at 95-143. A criminal procedure code, however, could be drafted by
a congressionally appointed body, pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment: the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments have been incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment by the Supreme Court, and § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment allows Con-
gress to enforce the terms of that Amendment. Id. at 145-46.
7 For a discussion of how the Court came to take on the task of declaring rules of
criminal procedure, see BRADLEY, supra note 6, at 6-36.
8 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
9 Id. at 220.
1o Id.
1' Id. at 221-23.
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He then removed the object, a crumpled cigarette package, from the
driver's pocket.1 2 He opened the package and found gelatin cap-
sules of white powder which later were determined to be heroin.13
The Supreme Court upheld the admission of the heroin at the
defendant's trial for narcotics possession. The majority, perJustice
Rehnquist, held that the Court had long recognized, albeit in dicta,
that a "search incident to arrest is a traditional exception to the war-
rant requirement."' 14 The Court further held, though without any
prior authority in dicta or otherwise, that such a search includes a
"full search" of the arrestee, even where the arrest is for a crime
(driving with a revoked permit) for which there is no evidence to be
found. 15 Thus, the Court approved the seizure and opening of the
cigarette pack, and, apparently, of any other containers found upon
arrestees, upon no showing beyond that of a lawful arrest.
Robinson can be criticized on the ground that, even though most
would agree that an arrestee should be routinely subject to a
patdown for weapons, 16 it does not follow that an evidentiary search
may be performed without probable cause that evidence may be
found and, possibly, a warrant. Since in Robinson no evidence could
have been found for the traffic violation for which the defendant was
being arrested, there was no probable cause, much less a warrant.
Therefore, any evidence seized from the suspect except a weapon
(or something that could have been a weapon 17) had to be sup-
pressed. Both the D.C. Circuit and the Robinson dissent adopted this
position.18
Professor Wayne LaFave agrees with the majority's result on
this issue. He argues that "a limitation on the 'general authority' to
search a person incident to arrest [to cases where there is] ... prob-
able cause that particular items of evidence are presently to be found
on the person" would be a rule "impossible of application by the
police."' 19 While I agree that this broad limitation would probably
do more harm than good, it is troubling that the Court permits a
12 Id. at 223.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 224.
15 Id at 235.
16 The entire D.C. Circuit, as well as the entire Supreme Court, agreed with this
proposition. United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en
banc); Robinson, 414 U.S. at 250 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
17 The policeman did not claim that he believed the cigarette pack was a weapon. See
Robinson, 414 U.S. at 223.
18 See Robinson, 471 F.2d at 1094; Robinson, 414 U.S. at 252 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
19 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 2 SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMEND-
MENT 448-49 (2d ed. 1987).
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routine full search incident to arrest when the police not only lack
probable cause that evidence will be found, but also have no reason
after the frisk to believe that either of the justifications for searches
incident to arrest-to find weapons and to find evidence-is pres-
ent. Still, as LaFave points out, once one concedes that a full search
of the arrestee's person is necessary to seek out weapons that might
not be disclosed by a frisk, such as a razor blade, then the seizure of
evidence found during such a search does not intrude further on the
arrestee's privacy. 20
However, as the Robinson dissenters noted, the search in that
case exceeded even this rather lenient standard, because the Robin-
son majority also approved, without discussion, "a separate search of
effects found on [the arrestee's] person. ' 21 As Justice Marshall ob-
served in dissent, "even if the crumpled-up cigarette package had in
fact contained some sort of a small weapon, it would have been im-
possible for respondent to have used it once it was in the officer's
hands." 22 Thus, if there is to be a meaningful warrant requirement,
the appropriate course of action by police would be to seize any
containers, such as cigarette packs, wallets, purses and briefcases
possessed by arrestees, and only open them with a search warrant
based on probable cause that the receptacle contains evidence of a
crime.
This approach is consistent with United States v. Chadwick,23 in
which the Court held that the warrantless search of a footlocker by
police was unjustifiable, despite the presence of probable cause to
search and despite the possessor's arrest. In Chadwick, federal nar-
cotics agents seized a footlocker which they had probable cause to
believe contained marijuana. 24 They later opened it without ob-
taining a search warrant and found marijuana on which basis the
defendant was subsequently convicted. 25 The Court, per Chief Jus-
tice Burger, held:
In this case, important privacy interests were at stake. By placing per-
sonal effects inside a double-locked footlocker, respondents mani-
fested an expectation that the contents would remain free from public
examination. No less than one who locks the doors of his home
20 Id. at 455. However, LaFave goes on to suggest that, if the police are going to get
a broad power to search people who are subjected to a "custodial arrest," more atten-
tion should be paid to the issue of whether a "custodial arrest" was justified in the first
place, particularly in traffic cases like Robinson. Id. at 456-61.
21 Robinson, 414 U.S. at 255 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
22 Id. at 256 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
23 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
24 Id. at 3.
25 Id. at 4-5.
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against intruders, one who safeguards his personal possessions in this
manner is due the protection of the Fourth Amendment Warrant
Clause. There being no exigency, it was unreasonable for the Govern-
ment to conduct this search without the safeguards a judicial warrant
provides.2 6
In Chadwick, the Court rejected the Government's argument
that since the Court permitted searches of cars without warrants, it
should permit a search of the footlocker. 27 Although a footlocker,
like a car, is mobile, the Court held that one had alesser expectation
of privacy in a car than in a footlocker. "Unlike an automobile,
whose primary function is transportation, luggage is intended as a
repository of personal effects."' 28 Even the two dissenters agreed
that the government's argument, "restrict[ing] the protection of the
Warrant Clause to private dwellings and a few other 'high privacy
areas'" was "an extreme view of the Fourth Amendment." 29
Thus Chadwick, decided after Robinson, specifically held that a
footlocker and other "possessions within an arrestee's immediate
control" were immune from warrantless searches, incident to arrest
or otherwise.30 One could dismiss the seemingly contrary result in
26 Id. at 11.
27 Id at 12. The Court further noted that "the Government does not contend that
the footlocker's brief contact with Chadwick's car makes this an automobile search." Id.
at 11. In Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), however, the Government did argue
that an automobile search extended to all containers found in the vehicle. Id. at 762.
The Court rejected that argument, holding that a suitcase seized from a car could only
be searched pursuant to a warrant. Id. at 763-64. The Court reversed Sanders in Califor-
nia v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991). See infra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
28 Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13.
29 Id. at 17 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun, recognizing that the major-
ity's rule was inconsistent with both Robinson and the auto search cases, would have held
that "a warrant is not required to seize and search any movable property in the posses-
sion of a person properly arrested in a public place." Id. at 19 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing). Blackmun, however, did not explain how his position differed from what he
considered the "extreme view" of the government. Indeed, he did not seem to recog-
nize, either in Chadwick, or in his majority opinion in Acevedo, that the practical effect of
his position in these two cases was to achieve the "extreme" result that he decried in
Chadwick.
30 Id. at 14-15. The Chadwick Court specifically distinguished Robinson as a case in-
volving a "search of the person." Id. at 16 n.10. By contrast, "searches of possessions
within an arrestee's immediate control cannot be justified by any reduced expectations
of privacy caused by the arrest." Id.
It may be that this footnote was added by a concurring Justice. It seems inconsis-
tent with the text of the ChiefJustice's opinion which noted that the "search ... cannot
be viewed as incidental to arrest" because it occurred "long after respondents were se-
curely in [police] custody." The opinion thus suggested that a warrantless search inci-
dent would have been appropriate at the time of the arrest. Id. at 15. Moreover, the
footnote is completely inconsistent with Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983), also
written by the ChiefJustice, which assumed that a search of containers in the arrestee's
possession was appropriate incident to arrest. See Craig M. Bradley, The Uncertainty Prin-
ciple in the Supreme Court, 1986 DUKE L.J. 1, 28, 40-50 (suggesting that such footnote
1993] 433
CRAIG M. BRADLEY
Robinson by concluding that the Court simply did not consider the
cigarette package a sufficiently important repository of personal ef-
fects, or its opening a sufficient intrusion, to require a warrant.3'
This view is bolstered by the fact that the Robinson majority did not
discuss the search of the cigarette pack as a separate intrusion; they
simply assumed that looking in it was part and parcel of a routine
search incident to arrest (unlike the opening of a full-fledged "re-
pository of personal effects"). 32
Any such interpretation of Robinson is, however, discredited by
the decisions in United States v. Edwards 33 and Illinois v. Lafayette.34 In
Edwards, the Court approved the post-detention seizure and search
of an arrestee's clothes 35 and also discussed with approval Abel v.
United States3 6 where "the defendant was arrested at his hotel but the
[suitcase] taken with him to the place of detention was searched
there." 37 The Edwards Court characterized Abel as supporting the
proposition that "searches and seizures that could be made on the
spot at the time of arrest may legally be made at the place of
detention." 38
In Lafayette, the Court approved a pre-incarceration "inventory
search" at the stationhouse of an arrestee's "purse-type shoulder
bag."'39 The Court, without specifically discussing the "container
search" aspect of Robinson, apparently assumed that, since the bag
could have been searched at the scene of the arrest under Robinson
and Chimel as an area within the immediate control of the arrestee,40
and since the custody at the police station is "no more than a contin-
uation of the custody inherent in the arrest status," 4 1 it followed
insertion is a frequent practice of concurring Justices which can, as in Chadwick, lead to
confusion about just what the rule is).
31 The alternative way to distinguish Robinson and Chadwick-that a search incident to
arrest may be broader in scope than a search based on probable cause-makes no sense
as to containers. Such containers can as easily be held pending the obtainment of a
warrant when they are seized incident to arrest as they can when seized for evidentiary
search purposes.
32 Chadwick, 433 U.S. 13.
33 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
34 462 U.S. 640 (1983).
35 Edwards, 415 U.S. at 806.
36 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
37 Edwards, 415 U.S. at 803 (citing Abel, 362 U.S. at 217).
38 Id.
39 Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 641.
40 In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), the Court held that a routine search
incident to arrest could be performed on the arrestee and the "area within his immedi-
ate control." Id. at 763. Neither Chimel nor Robinson discussed the propriety of search-
ing containers, such as a suitcase, that could be easily secured until a warrant was
obtained.
41 Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 645.
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that "any container or article in [the] possession" of an arrestee is
subject to a full search, either at the scene of the arrest or at the
stationhouse.4 2 Thus, the Court in Edwards and Lafayette assumed
what it had not explicitly held in Robinson: that a search incident to
arrest includes a search of all containers in the possession of the
arrestee, without any showing of cause for that search beyond what
is required for the arrest itself.
Conceding that an arrest entails a serious intrusion on one's
privacy, it is not obvious that a search of one's suitcase, briefcase or
purse is not a substantial further intrusion. If the Court is serious
about its oft-repeated claim that "searches conducted . . .without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically estab-
lished and well-delineated exceptions," 43 then the searches ap-
proved in Robinson and Lafayette should have been struck down.
There is no obvious reason why police cannot secure containers
seized from arrestees and search them only after getting a search
warrant based on probable cause. This would be consistent with the
Chadwick requirements for containers seized from non-arrestees. 44
Once the Court agreed that such containers, as "repositories of per-
sonal effects," are subject to Fourth Amendment protection, it
should have offered a justification for dispensing with this protec-
tion when a person is arrested.45 Yet neither Robinson nor Lafayette
contains any such justification: the Robinson Court assumed without
42 Id. at 648. It is true, as Justice Marshall pointed out in his dissenting opinion in
Lafayette, that the majority did not quite say that a search of the shoulder bag would have
been appropriate at the scene of the arrest as a search incident to arrest. Id. at 649
(Marshall, J., dissenting). However, it seems clear that suitcases, shoulder bags, and
similar items are in the "area within the arrestee's immediate control" that the Court,
citing Chimel and Robinson, held that police could search at the scene. Id. at 644.
43 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). See also United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798, 825 (1982). But see Bradley, supra note 1, at 1473-74 (pointing out that the
Court has created over 20 exceptions to this "rule").
44 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). Indeed, Justice Blackmun, dissent-
ing in Chadwick, conceded that "impounding the footlocker without searching it would
have been a less intrusive alternative in this case. The police could have waited to con-
duct their search until after a warrant had been obtained." Ia- at 19 (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting). However, he concluded that "the mere fact that a warrant could have been
obtained while the footlocker was safely impounded does not necessarily make the war-
rantless search unreasonable." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Yet this conclusion is
flatly inconsistent with a warrant requirement, which declares warrantless searches per se
unreasonable subject to a few narrow, and presumably justifiable, exceptions.
45 One such justification might be the potential dangerousness of containers seized
from suspects. Of course, as the Court noted in Chadwick, if "officers have reason to
believe that luggage contains some immediately dangerous instrumentality, such as ex-
plosives," a warrant is not required. Id. at 15 n.9. The fact that some packages might be
dangerous is hardly a reason for dispensing with a warrant requirement for all packages.
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discussion that the "container search" in that case was valid, and the
Lafayette Court used that assumption as the starting point for con-
cluding that pre-incarceration, "no cause" stationhouse searches of
containers were also valid.46
B. NEW YORK V. BELTON 4
7
The Court made its second "wrong" turn in New York v. Belton.
In that case, a highway patrolman stopped a speeding car, smelled
marijuana, and saw an envelope marked "Supergold" on the floor
of the car.48 He recognized "Supergold" as a street name for mari-
juana.49 He ordered the occupants out of the car and arrested them
for possession of marijuana. He then searched the passenger com-
partment of the car. He found marijuana in the envelope and co-
caine in the zippered pocket of a jacket on the back seat.50
The Supreme Court upheld the search and conviction, citing
the need for "a set of rules which, in most instances, makes it possi-
ble [for the police] to reach a correct determination beforehand as
to whether an invasion of privacy is justified." 51 Accordingly, the
majority held that the passenger compartment of an automobile, in-
cluding containers found therein, may always be searched "incident
to arrest" of the occupants without any additional showing of cause
or exigent circumstances because that compartment is generally, if
46 One might argue that a full "no cause" search is a necessary concomitant of incar-
ceration, and since such a search is going to take place at the stationhouse anyway, there
is no reason to bar it at the scene. As the Court in Lafayette argued at some length, there
are additional reasons for allowing a full pre-incarceration search that do not apply at
the time of arrest. Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 645-46 (inventory searches safeguard the arres-
tee's belongings from theft). However, none of these reasons is a very convincing
ground for dispensing with a serious warrant "requirement," and, in any case, many
arrests don't lead to incarceration.
Alaska and Hawaii appear to be the only states that have limited pre-incarceration
searches to simply sealing containers that the police lack cause to open. See, e.g., State v.
Kaluna, 520 P.2d 51, 61-62 (Haw. 1974), overruled on other grounds by State v.Jenkins, 619
P.2d 108 (Haw. 1980); Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727, 736-37 (Alaska 1979). Cf People
v. Walker, 228 N.W.2d 443, 446 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975), overruled on other grounds by Peo-
ple v.Johnson, 268 N.W.2d 259 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) ("It would be naive and pointless
to assume that law enforcement officials may store an arrestee's personal effects without
first determining what it is they are inventorying.").
In England, searches of arrestees may only be performed upon "reasonable ground
for suspicion" that evidence of a crime will be found, although a full inventory search is
permitted if the arrestee is taken to the stationhouse. Craig M. Bradley, The Emerging
International Consensus as to Criminal Procedure Rules, 14 MICH.J. INT'L L., 171, 178 (1993).
47 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
48 Id. at 455-56.
49 Id. at 456.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 458 (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, "Case by Case Adjudication" versus "Standardized
Procedures'" The Robinson Dilemma, 1976 Sup. CT. REv. 127, 142).
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not inevitably, an "area into which an arrestee might reach in order
to grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m]." 52
Yet, as Justice Brennan pointed out in dissent, the "clear rule"
of Belton is not especially clear53 and "abandons the justifications
underlying Chimel."54 That is, Chimel v. California55 had limited
searches incident to arrest to areas "within [the] immediate control"
of the arrestee.56 By contrast, Belton allowed such a search, without
cause, of both the passenger compartment of the car and of the con-
tainers found therein, even after the arrestee had been removed
from the car and the car's contents were "unaccessible" 57 to him.
Worse, Belton, by permitting police to conduct no-cause searches of
cars incident to a custodial arrest encouraged police to take people
into custody for traffic offenses in order to get a look at the car's
contents. 58 Such a broad license to search is completely incompati-
ble with a meaningful warrant requirement which demands a war-
rant unless there is a very good reason not to get one.
Thus, after Belton and Robinson/Edwards/Lafayette, if the police
had probable cause that an individual had committed a crime, they
could arrest her, search her person, search any containers she was
carrying and search any vehicle she was in at the time of arrest. Still,
the Chadwick warrant requirement remained in force as to the indi-
52 Id. at 460 (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)).
53 Id. at 470 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For example, Brennan asked:
Would a warrantless search incident to arrest be valid if conducted five minutes
after the suspect left his car? Thirty minutes? Three hours? Does it matter whether
the suspect is standing in close proximity to the car when the search is conducted?
Does it matter whether the police formed probable cause to arrest before or after
the suspect left his car? ... Does [this search] include locked glove compartments,
the interior of door panels, or the area under the floorboards? Are special rules
necessary for station wagons and hatchbacks, where the luggage compartment may
be reached through the interior, or taxicabs, where a glass panel might separate the
driver's compartment from the rest of the car? Are the only containers that may be
searched those that are large enough to be "capable of holding another object"?
Or does the new rule apply to any container even if it "could hold neither a weapon
nor evidence of the criminal conduct for which the suspect was arrested"?
The Court does not give the police any "bright line" answers to these ques-
tions. More important, because the Court's new rule abandons the justifications
underlying Chimel, it offers no guidance to the police officer seeking to work out
these answers for himself.
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
54 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)).
55 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
56 Id at 763.
57 The New York Court of Appeals found the car's contents "unaccessible" to the
arrestee. State v. Belton, 407 N.E.2d 420, 421 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1980), quoted in Belton, 453
U.S. at 467.
58 See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 450-51 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See also 3 LAFAvE, supra note 19, at 12-21, for further criticisms of the Belton holding.
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vidual whom the police had probable cause to believe possessed evi-
dence, but for whom there was no probable cause, or no desire, to
arrest. Until recently, Chadwick also applied to automobile searches,
as the Court stated in Arkansas v. Sanders.59 That is, if police had
probable cause only to search a suitcase or other container found in
an automobile, they had to obtain a search warrant before opening
the container. But, as United States v. Ross 60 held, if they had prob-
able cause to search the automobile generally, then they could
search it fully, including opening any containers found therein.
C. CALIFORNIA V. ACEVEDO
6 1
The third wrong decision is California v. Acevedo, decided in
1991, nine years after the Ross rule went into effect. Acevedo set out
to resolve the tension between Sanders and Ross, which, when read
together, stated that police, with probable cause to believe that evi-
dence is in a container in an automobile, could search that container
without a warrant if they had probable cause to search the vehicle
generally, but not if their probable cause was "container specific." 62
In Acevedo, the police saw a suspect place a paper bag, contain-
ing what they had probable cause to believe was marijuana, in the
trunk of his car.63 They stopped the car, opened the trunk, and
opened the bag which contained marijuana.64 Since probable cause
was aimed at the bag alone, rather than at the car as a whole, under
the Chadwick/Sanders rule, the police should have obtained a search
warrant before opening the bag.
The Court, however, came out the other way, holding that the
Chadwick/Sanders rule "has devolved into an anomaly such that the
more likely the police are to discover drugs in a container, the less
authority they have to search it.... The ... rule is the antithesis of
a 'clear and unequivocal' guideline." 65 Thus, citing the confusion
caused by "our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence," 66 Acevedo held
that "[t]he police may search an automobile and the containers
59 442 U.S. 753 (1979). In Sanders, the police had probable cause that a green suit-
case carried by the suspect contained marijuana. The suitcase was searched after the
police stopped the taxi in which the suspect had placed it. Id. at 755. Citing Chadwick
and the warrant requirement, the Court struck down the search. Id at 762-64.
60 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982).
61 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991).
62 For criticism of the Ross rule, see Yale M. Kamisar, The "Automobile Search" Cases:
The Court Does Little to Clarify the "Labyrinth" of Judicial Uncertainty, in 3 THE SUPREME
COURT, TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 69 (1982).
63 Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1984.
64 Id. at 1985.




within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or
other evidence is contained." 67 That is, in Acevedo, even though
their probable cause was "container specific," the police could
search the container on the spot, without first obtaining a search
warrant.
As the Acevedo Court made clear, however, two protections re-
main. First, as with any search, the search may not exceed the scope
of the probable cause.6 8 Thus, if probable cause is "container spe-
cific," police may only search the car for the container and the
container for the evidence. They may not, for example, look in the
glove compartment if they believe that the evidence is in a suit-
case. 69 Nor may they look in the glove compartment, or in a suit-
case, if the kind of evidence they are seeking, such as illegal aliens,
could not be concealed there.70 However, this first limitation ap-
plies to all searches, whether by warrant or not. Thus, it does not
represent any continuing vitality for the warrant requirement as to
these types of searches.
In contrast, the second limitation does rest on the warrant re-
quirement. If such a suitcase or briefcase is not found in a vehicle,
Acevedo suggests that Chadwick will still apply. That is, absent an
arrest, a warrant must still be obtained before the suitcase, the purse
or the pockets of a person walking down the street may be searched,
even if the police have probable cause that such a receptacle con-
tains evidence of a crime.71
But, as both the Acevedo dissenting and concurring opinions
rightly point out,72 the Acevedo holding leaves a new, even uglier,
anomaly lurking one step to the right of the old one. Why should a
person walking down the street with a locked suitcase containing his
personal effects be protected against warrantless search, but lose that
protection when he locks the suitcase in the trunk of his car?73 This
makes even less sense than the old rule.
Indeed, it makes so little sense that it leads Professor James
Tomkovicz to conclude that the Court may be on the verge of over-
67 Id. at 1991.
68 Id. at 1988.
69 "[Plolice did not have probable cause to believe that contraband was hidden in
any other part of the automobile and a search of the entire vehicle would have been
without probable cause and unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Id at 1991.
70 See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982).
71 In Acevedo, the Court made it clear that it was the need to "adopt one clear-cut rule
to govern automobile searches" that prompted it to overrule Sanders. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct.
at 1991.
72 Id. at 1993 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 2000-01 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73 Id. at 2001 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ruling Chadwick and abandoning the warrant requirement altogether
as to searches conducted out-of-doors. This would, in effect, limit
the requirement to "homes and other private buildings . . .and,
perhaps, private conversations. ' 74
The Court in Acevedo claims that this is just another narrow case
interpreting the automobile exception, and that the "cardinal prin-
ciple that searches conducted.., without prior approval by a judge
or magistrate, are per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few
specifically established and well delineated exceptions," is still in
force. 75 But the logic of Acevedo, combined with that of Robinson and
Belton, suggests a different conclusion as noted above.
Suppose, for example, that Acevedo had placed his bag of mari-
juana in the basket of a bicycle, rather than in the trunk of a car.
Surely that would not have entitled him to any more protection than
he got in the case before the Court. Nor would he have been enti-
tled to more protection if he had his bag on an airport luggage car-
rier. Each of these vehicles is mobile-indeed, under certain
circumstances, each may be more elusive than an automobile. And
surely each of these vehicles offers its user much less privacy than an
automobile. Thus, the reasons given for the automobile exception
to the warrant requirement in the first place-mobility and lessened
expectations of privacy-are even more apparent in the case of the
bicycle and luggage carrier than in the case of an automobile.76
But if the suspects with the containers on the bicycle and the
luggage cart are not afforded any greater Fourth Amendment pro-
tection than the suspect in a car, then surely the suspect on foot,
carrying his briefcase in his hand, cannot be either. There is simply
no logical hook on which to hang a warrant requirement once that
requirement has been abandoned in all of the cases discussed
above. Since cars and pockets are the two areas outside the home in
which one has the greatest expectation of privacy, once the warrant
requirement has been abandoned for containers found in those ar-
eas there is nothing left of the warrant requirement. 77
74 JamesJ. Tomkovicz, California v. Acevedo: The Walls Close in on the Warrant Require-
ment, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1103, 1115 n.86 (1992). See also Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1992-
93 (Scalia, J., concurring). In contrast to professor Tomkovicz, I see this as a positive
development, at least in pragmatic terms. See Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism and
Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199 (1993) (discussing how such
pragmatism underlies many Fourth Amendment decisions).
75 Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1991 (citations omitted).
76 The Court conceded this point in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), but
held, despite this logic, that when probable cause was "container specific" a warrant
must be obtained, as Chadwick and Sanders had held. Id. at 809.
77 One remaining area, not specifically covered by any of the decided cases, or by the
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In each of the three "wrong" cases, had the burden been placed
on the government to justify the abandonment of the warrant "re-
quirement," it would have been unable to do so. Assuming that the
warrant requirement is a good rule, then there is no compelling rea-
son why police cannot seize containers found on suspects, or in
their cars, incident to arrest or otherwise, but open them only upon
demonstrating probable cause to a judicial officer. In individual
cases, there may of course be some exigent circumstances that com-
pel the waiver of the rule. But if the warrant requirement is taken
seriously outside the home, then absent an emergency, the vehicles
in which people are riding, the containers that they possess and the
pockets of their clothing could only be searched with a warrant (or,
for weapons only, incident to arrest). Instead, in an effort to craft
"clear rules for police to follow," the Court, by not requiring a war-
rant in these cases, has abandoned the warrant requirement.
Many would argue that these cases are "wrong" because the
warrant requirement is a valuable protection of civil liberties that
must be imposed whenever possible. Such critics are, however, sim-
ply arguing as a tenth Justice that "if I was on the Court, things
would be different."78 A tenth Justice who was more in step with
the nine sitting could argue equally well that the warrant require-
ment makes no sense in outdoor searches: it is unduly burdensome
and may actually result in more, rather than less, of an intrusion on
civil rights, since time-consuming warrant procedures, possibly in-
volving extended detention of suspects, might force searches to be-
anticipated abandonment of Chadwick, is the pockets of a person not subject to custodial
arrest. But if a purse is to be subject to a warrantless search, and if everybody's person is
subject to a warrantless frisk for weapons on reasonable suspicion as well as a full search
upon probable cause to arrest, then it makes little sense to try to single out the pockets
of a person whom the police have probable cause to search but not to arrest. Indeed,
unlike containers, which can be readily seized while a warrant is sought, requiring a
warrant for the search of a person's pockets would result in a greater loss of civil liberty
than the contrary rule because the person would have to be held for the time it took to
get a warrant. It would also pose a greater danger for police who would have to stand
guard over a person while awaiting the warrant, possibly for several hours, without hav-
ing fully searched, or, in the absence of reasonable suspicion that he was armed and
dangerous, even frisked, his person.
The mails are a further "outside" area as to which the Court has not yet abandoned
the search warrant requirement. See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 10. If the Court abandoned
the warrant requirementfor searches of the mails, such searches should, and could, be
protected by a federal statute in the same manner that telephone conversations are cur-
rently protected. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq. (1988) (regulating electronic surveillance
by state and federal agents).
78 Indeed, the Acevedo dissent did a good job of arguing that, if you start with a war-
rant "requirement," then the Court's reasoning in that case is nonsense. Acevedo, 111 S.
Ct. at 1994 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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come more drawn out and extensive.79
I do not conclude that Robinson, Belton and Acevedo are "wrong"
because they abandon the warrant requirement, which, in any case,
is based on questionable historical authority-especially when ap-
plied out of doors.80 Rather, they are wrong because, while aban-
doning the warrant requirement, the Court insists that it is
retaining, indeed cherishing, it! Such praise for the emperor's
clothes inevitably tends to confuse the issue of what his future war-
drobe should look like.
To summarize the state of the law of outdoor searches, assum-
ing that the Chadwick rule is doomed: an individual walking down
the street may be arrested without a warrant and his person and any
container he is carrying may be fully searched incident to arrest if
there is probable cause that he has committed any arrestable of-
fence, as Robinson and United States v. Watson8" make clear. If police
only have probable cause that he possesses evidence, but not that he
has committed a crime, he may be stopped and his person and any
containers he is carrying may be fully searched for that evidence.
Although the search cannot exceed the scope of the probable cause
(for example, his pockets cannot be searched for machine guns), it is
not, assuming Chadwick's demise, subject to a warrant requirement.
Similarly, if the suspect is driving, pedaling or flying, his vehicle
(even a recreational vehicle in which he lives8 2) can be stopped and
searched without a warrant, to the extent of the probable cause. Fi-
nally, if there is probable cause to arrest anybody in a car, the pas-
senger compartment of that car and any containers found therein
may be searched incident to that arrest-even if the arrest is for a
traffic violation that could produce no evidence, and even if the au-
tomobile is not an "area within the immediate control" of the arres-
tee at the time of the search.8 3
79 This is, indeed, the argument that the majority made in Acevedo:
If the police know that they may open a bag only if they are actually searching the
entire car, they may search more extensively than they otherwise would in order to
establish the general probable cause required by Ross.
We cannot see the benefit of a rule that requires law enforcement officers to
conduct a more intrusive search in order to justify a less intrusive one.
Id. at 1988-89.
80 See Bradley, supra note 42, at 1486. For an extended historical discussion see,
Tomkovicz, supra note 74, at 1129-41; TELFORD TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITU-
TIONAL INTERPRETATION 19 (1969).
81 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (no warrant required for arrest in public place).
82 See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
83 Furthermore, the trunk of a car and containers found therein can be searched
prior to impoundment without either probable cause or a warrant. See Colorado v. Ber-
tine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987).
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II. THE Two MODEL APPROACH
In a 1985 article entitled Two Models of the Fourth Amendment,8 4 I
urged that the Court abandon the fictitious warrant "requirement,"
which at the time was subject to about twenty exceptions, and adopt
one of two approaches. First, the Court could treat the warrant re-
quirement seriously and require a warrant (obtained by telephone if
necessary) before every search, subject only to a single, rigorously
enforced, exigent circumstances exception.8 5 Alternatively, the
Court could forthrightly admit that the warrant requirement is un-
workable and simply judge each search on the basis of its reasona-
bleness, as the Fourth Amendment, by its terms, requires.86
It now appears that the Court, citing the "extent to which our
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has confused the [lower]
courts,"8 7 is on the verge of adopting the reasonableness approach
to outside searches while retaining the warrant requirement as to
homes and related structures. Justice Scalia, citing my Article in his
concurring opinion in Acevedo,88 urged the Court to do this openly:
[T]he path out of this confusion should be sought by returning to the
first principle that the "reasonableness" requirement of the Fourth
Amendment affords the protection that the common law afforded
[for instance, warrants required for searches of the home but not
otherwise].... [T]he supposed "general rule" that a warrant is always
required does not appear to have any basis in common law ... and
confuses rather than facilitates any attempt to develop rules of reason-
ableness in light of changed legal circumstances, as the anomaly elimi-
nated, and the anomaly created by today's holding both
demonstrate. 89
The remainder of this Article assumes that the Court adopts the
84 Bradley, supra note 1.
85 Id. at 1471. As I noted, this approach "revitalizes the proposition ofJustice Frank-
furter in his dissent in United States v. Rabinowitz that 'a search is unreasonable unless a
warrant authorizes it, barring only exceptions justified by absolute necessity.' " Id. at 1497
(quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 (1950)) (emphasis added). Rabino-
witz was overruled by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
86 Bradley, supra note 1, at 1471. As I noted, "there is considerable historical evi-
dence that [this] view of the [Flourth [A]mendment ... is exactly what the framers of the
Constitution had in mind and that the warrant requirement ... has 'stood the [F]ourth
[A]mendment on its head' from a historical standpoint." Id. at 1486 (quoting TAYLOR,
supra note 80, at 23-24). See also Tomkovicz, supra note 74, at 1136-41 (finding the his-
torical data inconclusive). Professor Tomkovicz, after a thorough discussion of the rea-
sons for and against retaining the warrant requirement, concludes "[i]f the choice were
mine, the warrant rule would survive." Id. at 1163.
87 California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1990 (1991).
88 Id. at 1992 (Scalia, J., concurring).
89 Id. at 1993 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). The common law protection




approach that Scalia and the logic of Acevedo suggest, and discusses
the appearance of the new Fourth Amendment terrain. That is, will
the new approach be a "path out of this confusion" 90 or simply a
Fourth Amendment that, while less restrictive on police, is every bit
as bewildering as the approach of the last thirty years? In my view,
such a bifurcated approach could, if the Court handles it properly,
result in significant gains in the clarity and the workability of Fourth
Amendment doctrine. Thus, in that pragmatic sense, I argue that
three wrongs-Robinson, Belton and Acevedo-can make a "right."
As noted, the crucial first step toward developing such a worka-
ble, "two model" approach to the Fourth Amendment is to admit
that the warrant requirement is to be partially abandoned. The
Acevedo majority, to the contrary, stoutly insisted that the warrant
requirement survived and that the case was simply a further explica-
tion of one of the "specifically established and well-delineated ex-
ceptions." 91 But, as discussed above, such a claim is nonsense as to
outdoor searches in light of Robinson, Belton, and particularly
Acevedo.92
By contrast, the warrant requirement does retain its cloak of
authority as to searches of the home. For example, in order to
arrest a person at home, the police must obtain an arrest warrant, 93
and to arrest him in the home of another, the police must obtain a
search warrant. 94 A search incident to arrest of a person arrested
out of doors may not extend into the home without a warrant,95 and
"application of the exigent-circumstances exception in the context
of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable
cause to believe that only a minor offense . . . has been
committed." 96
90 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
91 Id. at 1991.
Our holding today neither extends the Carroll doctrine nor broadens the scope of
the permissible automobile search .... It remains a cardinal principle that searches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magis-
trate are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.
Id.
92 Or, as Professor LaFave branded another aspect of the decision, "unmitigated
poppycock." 3 LAFAVE, supra note 19, at 16 (Supp. 1994).
93 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). Cf United States v. Watson, 423
U.S. 411 (1976) (no warrant required to arrest a suspect out of doors).
94 See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981). The difference is that an arrest
warrant for an individual at his own home would stay in force indefinitely, whereas a
search warrant for an individual at someone else's home must specify why the police
have reason to believe that he is there now.
95 Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
96 Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984).
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Two cases, decided'just a year apart, illustrate the Court's dif-
fering approach to home versus outdoor searches. In United States v.
Knotts,97 the Court unanimously approved the warrantless place-
ment of an electronic beeper in a can of chemicals used in drug
manufacture in order to follow a car transporting the chemicals.
The majority held that this was not a "search."
A person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to
another .... Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police
from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth
with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them in
this case.98
However, in United States v. Karo99 when a similarly bugged
container was used to determine whether the chemicals were still
inside a house, the Court concluded by a 7-2 vote1 00 that the moni-
toring of the beeper inside the house, even though the owner of the
container had agreed to the installation of the bug, was a "search"
for which a warrant was required.
Private residences are places in which the individual normally expects
privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a warrant....
Our cases have not deviated from this basic fundamental principal.
Searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presump-
tively unreasonable absent exigent circumstances. 101
The monitoring of an electronic device such as a beeper is, of
course, less intrusive than a full-scale search, but it does reveal a criti-
cal fact about the interior of the premises that the Government is ex-
tremely interested in knowing and that it could not have otherwise
obtained without a warrant. 102
97 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
98 Id. at 281-82. FourJustices concurred only in the judgment, arguing that the ma-
jority had unnecessarily discussed the "open fields" doctrine, and that, just because the
enhancement of senses by technological means was unobjectionable in this case didn't
mean it always would be. Id. at 287-88 (Blackmun and Stevens, JJ., concurring in the
judgment).
99 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
100 Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Rehnquist, disagreed with this portion of the
Court's reasoning, arguing that since the homeowner had no possessory interest in the
container, he lacked standing to protest the monitoring of it. Id. at 721-28 (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part and concurring in thejudgement). Three otherJustices concurred
in part and dissented in part.
101 Id- at 714-15. Compare this strong statement to the "specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions" language in discussing outdoor searches. See, e.g., Califor-
nia v. Acevedo, I11 S. Ct. 1982, 1992 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
102 Karo, 468 U.S. at 715. Since the agents would not know in advance where the
bugged container would be taken, the warrant requirement would be satisfied by
"describ[ing] the object into which the beeper is to be placed, the circumstances that led
agents to wish to install the beeper, and the length of time for which beeper surveillance
is requested." Id at 718.
1993] 445
CRAIG M. BRADLEY
Even Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist, who disagreed with
this portion of the opinion, would have required a warrant if the
agents had bugged the defendant's own container, but contended
that the defendant had no expectation of privacy in someone else's
container.103 Thus, there is general agreement on the Court as to
the special protection to be afforded the home, even when it comes
to the extremely limited intrusion afforded by a beeper device that
tells nothing about the private lives of the residents.104
This protection is not limited to houses. It unquestionably ex-
tends to other structures such as apartments 0 5 and hotel rooms, 106
even though neither is owned by the protected occupants, and both
are subject to entry by people other than the occupants and their
invitees. The protection also extends to police searches of of-
fices,' 07 schools,' 08 and business premises, 10 9 and apparently even
includes outbuildings on a farm. I0
The Court has also recognized that one particular outdoor area
may be subject to the warrant requirement, absent exigent circum-
stances. This is the curtilage of a house-the outdoor area immedi-
ately surrounding the structure."' However, this is because the
103 Id. at 723, 727 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judge-
ment). The dissenters likened Karo to United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), in
which the Court approved the warrantless monitoring of a bug worn by a police inform-
ant inside the suspect's house. The majority noted that a warrant would not have been
required if, as in White, a co-conspirator had been cooperating with the government. Id.
at 716 n.4.
104 Of similar effect are United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976), which does not
require an arrest warrant to arrest someone on the street, and Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573 (1980), which does require a warrant for an arrest in the home.
105 See Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
106 See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
107 In O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987), all nine Justices agreed that a police
search, at least of a private or semi-private office, would be illegal absent a search war-
rant, whether or not the employer was a private or public entity. The Justices differed
over the propriety of the search in that case, which was conducted by a government
employee's supervisor.
108 See NewJersey v. T.L.O. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
109 See Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
110 In United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987), the Court noted that "we have
assumed, but not decided," that a barn was an area protected by the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement. Id. at 304.
111 In Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 n.I 1(1984), the Court did not "con-
sider.., the degree of Fourth Amendment protection afforded the curtilage, as opposed
to the home itself." In Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301, the Court spoke of the curtilage as being
"placed under the home's 'umbrella' of Fourth Amendment protection" and assumed,
but did not explicitly hold, that a warrant was required to trespass on the curtilage.
The Dunn Court also tried to define what is, and what is not, curtilage.
[C]urtilage questions should be resolved with particular reference to four factors:
the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is
included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which
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curtilage is considered to be part and parcel of the home where the
"intimate activities of the home" are carried on and is under the
"umbrella" of the home's protections. 1 2 Thus, it is essentially con-
sistent with the indoor/outdoor dichotomy.
Also, though the government has consistently won cases in the
Supreme Court in which various technological devices were used to
surveil areas that are visible from outdoors, such as the area around
a factory or the contents of a greenhouse, the Court has made it
clear that homes and curtilage will not be subject to the sort of high-
tech surveillance that would interfere with a citizen's ordinary ex-
pectations of privacy, even though there was no physical trespass on
the citizen's property.' 13 Thus, the Court seems to have recognized
the potential to require a warrant for certain high-tech outdoor
searches, but only when these searches intrude into structures or
curtilage.
In particular, in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 1 4 the Court,
while approving the use of a sophisticated camera to take aerial
photos of the outdoor areas of petitioner's factory complex, ob-
served that "[i]t may well be, as the Government concedes, that sur-
veillance of private property by using highly sophisticated
surveillance equipment not generally available to the public, such as
satellite technology, might be constitutionally proscribed absent a
warrant." 115
the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observa-
tion by people passing by.
Id. at 301.
Thus, as Kamisar, LaFave and Israel summarized Dunn:
[T]he Court then concluded [that] the barn into which the police looked was not
within the curtilage, as it was 60 yards from the house, was outside the area sur-
rounding the house enclosed by a fence, did not appear to the police to be "used
for intimate activities of the home," and the fences outside the barn were not of a
kind "to prevent persons from observing what lay inside the enclosed area." The
Court added that even assuming the barn was protected business premises, it still
was no search to look into the open barn from an open field vantage point.
YALE KAMiSAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 156-57 (7th ed. 1990).
This protection is limited because ordinarily, when the police see something in the
curtilage, it is in plain view. Accordingly, information so obtained may be used, even
though no warrant was obtained. Moreover, since the police viewing frequently gives
rise to exigent circumstances, an immediate seizure of the viewed person or thing may
also be appropriate.
112 See, e.g., Dunn, 480 U.S. at 300-02.
113 In Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989), a majority of the Court agreed that war-
rantless surveillance of a house or curtilage from a helicopter flying at less than 400 feet
would be inappropriate. Id at 452-56 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgement); id.
at 456-67 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 467-68 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
114 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
115 Id. at 238. Accord California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 n.3 (1986) ("The State
acknowledges that 'aerial observation of curtilage may become invasive, either due to
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The dissenters in Dow Chemical protested that the use of a "so-
phisticated aerial mapping camera" that cost more than $22,000
and was capable of taking detailed photographs from as high as
1200 feet, was the sort of high-tech intrusion that interfered with the
petitioner's reasonable expectations of privacy. 11 6
The majority in Dow Chemical was surely influenced by several
factors that made the aerial search more palatable than other law
enforcement uses of high-tech equipment. First, Dow involved an
administrative search for air pollution violations. Second, the area
surveilled was an industrial complex that fell "somewhere between
'open fields' and curtilage."' 17 The Court specifically emphasized
that "unlike a homeowner's interest in his dwelling, 'the interest of
the owner of commercial property is not one in being free from in-
spections.' "118 Finally, the photographs in question were "not so
revealing of intimate details as to raise constitutional concerns."' 119
By contrast, "[an] electronic device to penetrate walls or win-
dows so as to hear and record confidential discussions of chemical
formulae or other trade secrets would raise very different and far
more serious questions." 120 Obviously, the warrantless use of such
devices on a private residence would raise insuperable constitu-
tional difficulties.
Thus, it seems clear that, not only physical trespass, but also
certain other technological intrusions into buildings and/or curti-
lages, are subject to the warrant requirement under current law and
would continue to be subject to it under the new regime. 121 How-
ever, there is little in these cases to suggest that high-tech surveil-
lance of public places or open fields would or should be subject to
the warrant requirement. On the contrary, since the Court has held
that intrusions into "open fields" and public places are not searches
physical intrusiveness or through modern technology which discloses to the senses
those intimate associations, objects or activities otherwise imperceptible to police or fel-
low citizens.' ").
116 Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 240 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
117 Id. at 236.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 238.
120 Id. at 239.
121 The Court's suggestion in Dow Chemical that certain high-tech searches outside the
curtilage (which are open fields by definition) may be subject to the warrant require-
ment, is inconsistent with its repeated insistence that an intrusion even onto a fenced
and posted "open field" is not a search. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170,
178 (1984); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (narcotics dog's sniffing of
luggage is not a search, even though it intrudes upon luggage, a protected area).
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at all, 122 it follows that no search warrant could be required, regard-
less of the sophistication of the electronic intrusion. Thus, it seems
likely that, despite the reservation expressed in Dow Chemical, the use
of satellite technology to surveil a field which is suspected of being a
staging area for arms smugglers, or a public street where criminals
are thought to congregate, for example, would be allowed without a
warrant, because such surveillance is not a "search."
A more difficult challenge to the indoor/outdoor formulation is
posed by the telephone booth in Katz v. United States,123 which, it
might be argued, is not "indoors" in any meaningful sense, but is
still, as Katz held, protected by the warrant requirement. Much of
the discussion in Katz could be read as applying equally to a phone
on a post by the roadside. 124 However, there is actually considera-
ble support in the opinion for the position that it was in fact the
"indoor" aspect of the phone booth that dictated the majority's re-
sult, and distinguished phones in booths from other public
phones. 125 The statutory formulation below distinguishes phone
booths from other public phones-a distinction that, if not entirely
satisfactory, is nevertheless clear. 126 The point is that enclosing
oneself in a structure is the key to triggering the Fourth Amend-
ment's search warrant protection. In any event, this particular issue
has been rendered moot by federal law which requires a warrant to
tap either kind of telephone. 127
A difficult problem is posed by car phones. Even though cars
122 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178.
123 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
124 For example, the Court in Katz made the following statement:
[The] effort to decide whether or not a given 'area,' viewed in the abstract, is 'con-
stitutionally protected' deflects attention from the problem presented by this case.
For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection .... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
Id. at 351-52.
125 The explicit holding of Katz is that, "one who occupies [a telephone booth], shuts
the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to
assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world."
Ia- at 352 (emphasis added). In his concurring opinion, which established the "expecta-
tions of privacy" formulation for which Katz is known, Justice Harlan stated that he un-
derstood the majority to be saying that "an enclosed telephone booth is an area, where,
like a home .... a person has a constitutionally protected expectation of privacy. ...
[C~onversations in the open would not be protected against being overheard." Id. at
361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
126 It must be emphasized that the only expectation of privacy that one has in a phone
booth is that the call will not be electronically monitored without a warrant. One has no
greater expectation of privacy in a phone booth than he does on the street as to warrant-
less arrests or searches for physical evidence.
127 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 etseq. (1988). Both state and federal authorities are required
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are not subject to the warrant requirement, a car is a Fourth Amend-
ment protected area such that entry into it is a "search" requiring
probable cause. Furthermore, one would seem to have as great an
expectation of privacy in his car as he does in a phone booth. Nev-
ertheless, the Court has surely become too firmly attached to the
automobile exception to require a warrant to overhear a car phone
under the Fourth Amendment (although Title III would again limit
such electronic surveillance). 128 Moreover, while one may have as
great an expectation of privacy in his car as in a phone booth against
physical intrusion, he also recognizes that phone conversations from
a car, beamed as they are over the airways rather than over a wire,
are not as secure as a call from a booth.
Thus, the statutory formulation below would not require a war-
rant to surveil automobiles and conversations held therein, or other
mobile containers, except "as otherwise required by law"- in this
case, by Title III.
Another exception to the inside/outside distinction under cur-
rent law is United States v. White.' 29 In White, the Court approved the
warrantless, but consensual, bugging of an informant who held con-
versations with the defendant in the defendant's home that were
overheard electronically by federal agents.130 A four Justice plural-
ity' 3 ' held that, just as the recipient of Katz' phone call could have
allowed police to overhear it and/or could report conversations to
the police, so could an informant allow police to listen in electroni-
cally on his conversation.13 2
However, the limits of White were established in United States v.
Karo,'33 where the majority held that the intrusion in White was not a
"search" because the defendant had no reasonable expectation that
the informant would not reveal the contents of the conversation to
another.' 3 4 Thus, although White remains good law, it is limited to
cases where one's trust in a confidant is misplaced.
A more troubling, albeit partial, exception to the in-
to conform electronic surveillance to the federal standards. KAMISAR ET AL., supra note
111, at 344.
128 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq.
129 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
130 Id. at 753.
131 Justice Black, the critical fifth vote on this issue, concurred only in the judgement.
Id. at 754 (Black,J., concurring). Justice Brennan, who also concurred in the judgement,
felt that such electronic overhearing should be subject to the warrant requirement. Id.
at 755 (Brennan, J., concurring).
132 Id.
133 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
134 Id. at 716 n.4.
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door/outdoor dichotomy is Chimel v. California.13 5 While Chimel is a
case that established limits on the power of police to search incident
to arrest in a home, in one important respect, it is guilty of not tak-
ing the warrant requirement seriously, in essentially the same man-
ner as Robinson. Even though the Court paid tribute to the warrant
requirement,1 6 it allowed a warrantless search, not only of the ar-
restee's person, which could be justified by the exigencies of the
arrest, 37 but also of "the area 'within his immediate control'[-]the
area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence."138
As in Robinson, this gives the police power that is inconsistent
with the warrant requirement. In the course of effecting an arrest,
the police should, in my view, have all the power they need to elimi-
nate even a slight chance that the arrestee might gain control of a
weapon. Thus, they can search her body and move her away from
grabbing distance of any suspicious drawers or niches, or interpose
themselves between the arrestee and such places. However, the
Chimel Court also allows warrantless, no-probable-cause searches
for evidence of areas within the "immediate control" of the arrestee,
apparently without regard to whether the arrest is for an offense
that could produce evidence or whether the arrestee in the instant
case actually has a capacity to grab for anything. 3 9 Thus, the police
are entitled to arrest someone for bail jumping and to search the
bureau drawer near her place of arrest despite the fact that there is
no evidence to be found for this offense nor any apparent danger
that she might reach in the drawer for a weapon. Worse, as LaFave
points out, lower courts have interpreted Chimel as permitting a
search of the entire room in which a suspect is arrested,1 40 and of
places where the arrestee no longer can grab because the police
have subdued her.' 4 1
To achieve its goal of declaring a clear and logical set of rules,
the Court, under the new two models regime, should limit searches
135 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
136 "We cannot be true to that constitutional requirement and excuse the absence of a
search warrant without a showing by those who seek exemption from the constitutional
mandate that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative." Id. at 761
(quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)).
137 See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
138 Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763.
139 For a discussion of the overbreadth of Chimel, especially as interpreted by the
lower courts, see 2 LAFAvE, supra note 19, at 623-35.
140 Id. § 6.3(c) n.28.
141 Id. § 6.3(c) nn.29 & 30. See also United States v. Turner, 926 F.2d 883 (9th Cir.
1991) (search incident to arrest valid because area was within immediate control of ar-
restee before he was handcuffed and removed from the room).
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incident to arrests inside the home to full searches of the person.
Searches of other areas should be governed by the probable
cause/search warrant standard, subject only to exigent circum-
stances and consent exceptions. Thus, the Court should not permit
a search for weapons unless there is an immediate danger that can-
not be diffused by less intrusive means, such as handcuffing the sus-
pect, and warrantless searches for evidence should be forbidden
absent both probable cause and exigent circumstances. 142
To summarize, with surprisingly few exceptions, 43 the Court
has been moving toward a "two model" approach to the Fourth
Amendment, requiring warrants to search inside of structures but
no warrants to search elsewhere, including searches of persons and
the containers they are carrying. As noted, if this approach could
actually resolve the myriad questions and doubts that have arisen
under the false "warrant requirement," it would be a major advance
for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In my view, it would be well
worth the very minor impact on civil liberties to abandon the last
straw of warrant protection out of doors-the Chadwick container
search warrant requirement.
Civil liberties are protected more fully by clear rules than by
unclear rules that only seem more protective on their face. If the
rules are unclear, the police, out of either ignorance or frustration,
will violate them, resulting in a loss of civil liberty for the suspect.
Then, since the suspect cannot be "unsearched," society will suffer a
further loss when the evidence is excluded to deter police miscon-
duct and a criminal is possibly set free or receives a favorable plea
bargain. If the rules are clearer, even if somewhat less restrictive on
police, neither undesirable outcome-breaches of suspects' rights
nor the subsequent evidentiary exclusion-need occur so often. 144
142 Of course, this exigent circumstance exception would not apply to evidence which
police had pre-existing probable cause to seize but neglected to mention in the warrant.
143 Another "inside" case that is not consistent with a meaningful warrant require-
ment is Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988). In Murray, the Court admitted
evidence initially discovered during an illegal, warrantless, break-in of a warehouse on
the ground that the evidence was only seized pursuant to a search warrant that was based
on probable cause that predated the break-in. The properly obtained search warrant
was an "independent source" and thus the evidence was not a fruit of the poisonous
break-in. Id. However, as I argued at the time, "[t]he holding in Murray will encourage
future police to break into houses, see if there is anything there, and then go for a war-
rant. The 'warrant requirement,' as a protection of the citizenry against unauthorized
police intrusions is thus rendered nugatory." Craig M. Bradley, Murray v. United States,
the Bell Tolls for the Search Warrant Requirement, 64 IND. LJ. 907 (1989). If the Court is to
be rigorous in the application of an "indoor" warrant requirement, then Murray, as well
as Chimel, should be overruled.
144 1 recognize, of course, that this argument cannot be extended to its limits. A really
clear rule for police would be, "search whenever you feel like it; no warrants required."
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III. A STATUTORY SYNTHESIS
My support for this "two model" development is purely prag-
matic. Accordingly, it depends upon whether a relatively simple and
straightforward rule can be crafted that will not disintegrate under
the weight of exceptions, unlike the present warrant "requirement."
A statutory formulation that would make the two model approach
both easy to grasp and criticize, would read as follows:
A. THE SEARCH WARRANT STATUTE
A. Definitions:
1. Structure: anything built by man that is not readily mobile
and has a roof.
2. Curtilage: the outdoor area immediately surrounding a
residence.
3. Search: any physical or technological intrusion into an area
in which anyone has a reasonable expectation of privacy.
B. Warrant Required:
Searches of structures or of curtilage by law enforcement au-
thorities for criminal evidence must be performed upon a search
warrant, based on probable cause and issued by a judicial officer.
This requirement will be waived only if the government establishes
by a preponderance of evidence that the government agents reason-
ably believed either that exigent circumstances demanded proceed-
ing without a warrant, or that a party whose interests were intruded
upon had consented.' 45
C. Warrant Not Required:
No other searches require a warrant except as otherwise pro-
vided by law, but all searches must be reasonable.
B. DISCUSSION
This statutory scheme, requiring a warrant for searches of
This rule would also result in no loss of civil liberties (as well as no evidentiary exclu-
sion) in individual cases since there would be no civil liberties left to lose.
145 Though searches incident to arrest are encompassed by this section, for the sake
of clarity it would be wise to have a separate section specifically governing such searches.
A. Searches Incident to Arrest:
1. Police may perform a full body search of anyone subject to custodial
arrest, as well as a search of any vehicle in which the suspect is found, without
any showing of cause.
2. Any further warrantless searches of structures for evidence following an
arrest must be based upon probable cause and exigent circumstances or
consent.
3. A protective sweep of areas other than the room in which the arrest oc-
curs may be performed if there is reasonable suspicion that people or objects
in such areas pose an immediate danger.
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structures, and of the curtilage of the home, but not for outdoor
areas, is consistent with the approach taken by other countries. A
study of the criminal procedure rules of six countries-Australia,
Canada, England, France, Germany and Italy-revealed that "out-
door" searches never require a warrant. 146 Indeed, in most coun-
tries, the warrant requirement was not even consistently applied to
searches of the home, 14 7 although a warrant requirement for inside
searches is the general rule.
This code, in abandoning the warrant requirement for outdoor
searches may be thought to favor police to the detriment of citizens'
rights. However, as discussed, it does not favor police significantly
more than the Court's current stance. Furthermore, by taking the
search warrant requirement seriously as to arrests in the home and
searches incident to those arrests, it also increases civil rights in a
significant way. More importantly, by providing a clear rule, it ad-
vances the interests of both police and citizenry by avoiding confu-
sion and mistakes. Anybody with a high school education can, I
believe, grasp when a warrant is and is not required under this code,
in all but the most arcane cases.
C. SECTION BY SECTION ANALYSIS
14 8
A § 1. This definition is essentially drawn from California v.
Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985), in which the Court held that a warrant
was not required to search an RV that was traveling on the street,
but did not "pass on the application of the vehicle exception to a
motor home that is situated in a way or place that objectively indi-
cates that it is being used as a residence." Id. at 394 n.3.149 This
146 See Bradley, supra note 46, at 171. A possible, limited, exception is Italy, where
searches of the "crime scene" must be performed pursuant to a warrant unless "a per-
son is caught in flagrante delicto," "a fugitive is evading police officers," or "when an
arrest warrant has been issued for a suspected criminal." Id. at 217. It is not clear
whether "crime scene" is limited to structures or would also include, for example, an
automobile suspected of containing contraband. In any event, if a weapon is suspected,
even a home may be searched without a warrant. Id.
147 For example, in Canada, warrantless entries of buildings to arrest and/or to search
for weapons are allowed, id. at 197, although the latter are not allowed as to domiciles.
Id. at 217 n.3 10. In England, a warrant is not required to enter a house to arrest for the
most serious offenses, or to search incident to that arrest. Id. at 180. Moreover, a war-
rantless search incident may take place even if the arrest is outside, but only on what
amounts to probable cause. Id. France has no real search warrant requirement. Id. at
203. Germany has recently adopted a de facto warrant requirement for searches of
homes only. Id. at 207. Australia has no national rule, but state rules generally require a
warrant to search homes, but apparently not to conduct other searches. Id. at 192-93.
148 This section by section analysis of the statutory scheme is written in the form of
"drafter's notes" with supplementary material in the footnotes.
149 The Court continued:
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definition does not, however, turn on the "residence" aspect, but on
mobility since that would seem, under current law, to be the key
factor in determining whether something is subject to the warrant
requirement or not.
The definition is also consistent with Oliver v. United States, 466
U.S. 170 (1984), which distinguished between a fenced, posted field,
which did not require a warrant to search, and a residence or curti-
lage, which did. It also answers in the affirmative a question left
open by Oliver-whether outbuildings are subject to the warrant re-
quirement.1 50 However, a packing crate in a field (mobile), a cave in
which a person lived (not built by man), and a phone booth attached
to the wall of a public place (no roof) are not "structures" and intru-
sion upon them, whether physical or electronic, is not a search. Sur-
veillance of car phones, while a "search," would be subject to a
probable cause, but not to a warrant requirement under the Fourth
Amendment. However, wiretaps of telephones without a warrant
are forbidden by federal statute. 15 1 Given the general intention and
ability of Congress to regulate use and misuse of the airwaves, in-
cluding car phones, and other mobile communications equipment,
it is appropriate to leave such regulation out of the Fourth
Amendment.
A § 2. This section codifies the Court's holdings in United
States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987) and Oliverv. United States, that the
curtilage is "the area around the home to which the activity of home
life extends." Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182 n.12. It makes it clear that
only residential structures have a curtilage. 152 To what extent cer-
tain multi-family dwellings may have a curtilage will depend on the
nature of the use accorded such property, as does the issue of
Among the factors that might be relevant in determining whether a warrant might
be required in such a circumstance is [the vehicle's] location, whether the vehicle is
readily mobile or instead, for instance, elevated on blocks, whether the vehicle is
licensed, whether it is connected to utilities, and whether it has convenient access to
a public road.
Id.
150 In United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987), the Court assumed, for the sake of
argument, that a barn was protected by the warrant requirement. Id. at 303.
151 Of course, the bus station or basketball stadium in which such a telephone is lo-
cated is a "structure," and if it were closed to the public, entry by police into such a
building might infringe on the owner's rights.
As previously discussed, searches of the mails would no longer be subject to a
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement but should receive that protection by federal
statute. See supra note 77.
152 While the question of whether a business can have a curtilage was left open in Dow
Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237-39 & n.7 (1986), the Court's other discus-
sions of curtilage have assumed that it was limited to the home. See, e.g., Dunn, 480 U.S.
at 294. This section makes that assumption explicit.
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whether certain land near a home is to be included.153
A § 3. This section does not attempt to improve on the cur-
rent, vague definition of "search" used by the Court. It does make
it clear that certain intrusions into areas that are otherwise protected
will nevertheless not require a warrant because the intrusions are
not "searches." Thus, police viewing, smelling or hearing illegal ac-
tivity in a home or curtilage is not itself a search, as long as the
police were in an area and/or were using equipment to which the
public reasonably had access. In such a case, the suspect would not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy. By the same token, the
user of a phone booth only has a reasonable expectation that his call
will not be electronically monitored. He'has no such expectation
that the police will not enter to arrest him or search his person.
Consequently, such entry is not a "search" (though the subsequent
arrest and/or search are a "seizure" and a "search," respectively.)
This section thus codifies such "plain view" cases as United
States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927) (use of flashlight not a "search");
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986); California v.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986); and Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445
(1989), all of which found that various kinds of low-tech surveillance
are not searches because they do not interfere with the suspect's
reasonable expectations of privacy. This section also recognizes
that certain high-tech intrusions might be seaches in that they vio-
late the individual's reasonable expectations of privacy. See, e.g.,
United States v. Karo 486 U.S. 705 (1984). In United States v. White,
401 U.S. 745, 753 (1971), the Court held that merely using electron-
ics to record what a police informer was prepared to tell the police
anyway did not violate the suspect's reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy, since the suspect was already aware that he might be betrayed
by the informer. Significantly, the Court upheld this intrusion de-
spite the fact that the conversation recorded occurred inside a pri-
vate home. Something that is not a "search" under current law,
remains outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment under this
code.
B. This paragraph requires a search warrant for any intrusion
into or within a structure, barring apparent consent or exigent cir-
153 In Dunn, the Court spelled out factors to consider in determining "whether the
area in question harbors those intimate activities associated with domestic life and the
privacies of the home." Dunn, 480 U.S. 301 n.4. Factors included:
the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is
included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which
the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observa-
tion by people passing by.
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cumstances. It thus limits the routine search incident to arrest to a
full body search, 15 4 but not a search of the home. Protective sweeps
are an exception, but only when justified by exigent circum-
stances.' 5 5 This paragraph also requires a search warrant, rather
than an arrest warrant, to enter and arrest an individual in his home,
absent consent or exigent circumstances. Compare Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) with Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204
(1981). Since entry into the house to effect an arrest is, in effect, a
"search" for the arrestee, a search warrant is appropriate.' 56 The
"arrest warrant" is thus abandoned.
In comparison to present law, this section substantially limits
searches incident to arrest but adheres to the stated rationale of
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), that "[a]bsent some grave
emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate be-
tween the citizen and the police." Id. at 761. It is flatly inconsistent
154 See Chimel v. California, 345 U.S. 752 (1969). See supra notes 39-58 and accompa-
nying text for a complete discussion of Chimel. Once the police have obtained a warrant
to breach the door of the suspect's dwelling, there is no justification for narrowing the
body search compared to the search police could perform outdoors. A custodial arrest
is always an exigent circumstance that justifies a full body search for weapons, and any
evidentiary material found may also be seized. It further extends to any containers in
the possession of the arrestee, as held in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
155 This approach differs slightly from Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990). In Buie,
the Court held that a cursory visual inspection of those places in which a person might
be hiding is permissible in "spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which
an attack could be launched," with no showing of cause required. Id. at 334. A further
protective sweep of other parts of the house could only be undertaken if the searching
officer "possessed a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts... that the
area [to be] swept harbor[s] an individual posing a danger to [those on the arrest
scene]." Id.
Buie is essentially based on an exigent circumstances rationale-the majority felt
that this rule was necessary to protect the officers' safety. 1d. at 333-34. However, deter-
mining exigent circumstances in advance is exactly what got the Court into the "excep-
tions" morass in the first place. See Bradley, supra note 1, at 1481-83. The appropriate
treatment of the protective sweep problem is to require the police to show a reasonable
suspicion of danger before any sweep, including one of "places immediately adjoining
the place of arrest." The more inherently dangerous the place, the easier this would be
to demonstrate. Presumably the Court drew this unfortunate distinction because Chimel
already permitted searches of such places incident to arrest. Thus, a modification of Buie
would be consistent with the suggested modification of Chimel.
156 While Payton purported only to require an arrest warrant to arrest an individual in
his home, the court concluded that "for Fourth Amendment purposes an arrest warrant
founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a
dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within." Payton,
445 U.S. at 603 (emphasis added). This provision thus requires that the "reason to
believe the suspect is within" be spelled out in the warrant, as is already required by
Steagald when the police want to search for the suspect in a non-suspect's home. In the
ordinary case, where the suspect is a more or less permanent resident of the place in
question, such a warrant will not suffer from staleness problems and thus will pose no
significant burden on police beyond that already imposed by Payton.
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with the warrant requirement to allow police to conduct a warrant-
less (and, under current law, no-probable-cause) search for evidence
in a person's house, even limited to the "area within his immediate
control," when the police have no reason to believe that evidence or
weapons will be found or that exigent circumstances require an im-
mediate search. 157
However, in the unusual case where the most reasonable police
behavior was to open a drawer or a closet before the suspect or one
of his henchmen could get to it to grab a weapon, the exigent cir-
cumstances exception will apply to allow any evidence found in
plain view in such a place to be used at trial. This exigent circum-
stance exception would also apply if the suspect or his henchmen
were about to destroy evidence. However, the government would
face the additional burden at trial of explaining not only why the
police reasonably believed that warrantless action was necessary,
but also why that evidence was not mentioned in the search warrant.
Thus, the ordinary "search incident to arrest" would be limited to a
full body search of the arrestee-the same as would be permissible
had he been arrested outdoors. Further searching is only justified
by a warrant, exigent circumstances or consent.
As noted above, a reasonable police belief that a protective
sweep was necessary could lead to a limited warrantless search and
to the finding of admissible evidence in plain view. Similarly, though
"hot pursuit" alone will not justify searching a house for a fleeing
suspect, a warrantless search would be allowable if the police can
show that it was not feasible to guard the exits while awaiting a war-
rant. In short, the government must establish exigent circumstances
in each case. This is what a warrant "requirement" means.
Searches inside structures without a warrant are never permit-
ted unless the government can establish consent or exigent circum-
stances in the individual case.158 Of course, now that police are
required to obtain a search warrant in order to arrest a suspect at
home, they will, no doubt, also obtain authorization to search for
157 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969). See supra part I.
158 See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987), in which the Court held that the fact that
the police were inside a house legitimately, did not give them the right to conduct a
further search, even one so limited as lifting up stereo equipment to check the serial
numbers against a list of stolen property. Compare Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287
(1984) (requiring a warrant to enter a house to investigate arson six hours after the fire
had been extinguished) with Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (finding that exigent
circumstances permitted warrantless entry before the fire was extinguished). Under the
formulation proposed here, exigent circumstances would have to be established in the
individual case contrary to Tyler.
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evidence that they have probable cause to believe is present. How-
ever, such a warrant may suffer from staleness problems in a way
that a warrant to search for a resident of a house may not.
The meaning of "consent" is spelled out in another section of
this code. 15 9 This paragraph adopts the "reasonable police belief in
consent" approach of Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188 (1990),
rather than requiring that the consenter had actual authority to
and/or actually did, consent. This paragraph is limited to searches
for evidence by police and thus does not apply to various kinds of
administrative searches, which are dealt with elsewhere.
f C. This paragraph establishes the absence of a warrant re-
quirement for all other searches for criminal evidence by police.
The other requisites for frisks, automobile searches, searches inci-
dent to arrest in public, etc., are spelled out in other sections. How-
ever, although certain searches, such as frisks, may require less than
probable cause, the result of this section is that upon probable cause
police may fully search any individual, vehicle or other container not
found in a "structure" or curtilage without a warrant, unless a war-
rant is otherwise required by law.
Searches that require intrusions into the body, such as the sur-
gery disapproved in Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) or the drug
testing approved in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656 (1989), are addressed in other sections of this code or are
subject to the reasonableness requirement. This is consistent with
the Court's current approach.
IV. CONCLUSION
The above formulation does lead to some rather arbitrary dis-
tinctions. For example, a trailer, parked in a trailer park for the
night, or for a month is not protected by the warrant requirement,
but a trailer up on blocks in the next space is protected. A person
calling from a phone booth in a bus station is protected, but a per-
son calling from a wall phone is not, (except by statute), despite the
fact that each has similar expectations of privacy as to electronic
eavesdropping. The drawing of clear lines always yields difficult
cases near the boundaries. Still, since the trailer up on blocks is
considerably less mobile, and since the phone in the booth is gener-
159 A similar two model scheme would be appropriate for consent searches, with out-
door consents (assuming probable cause is lacking) following current law by not requir-
ing police to inform suspects of their right to refuse consent. By contrast, a consent to
search a structure must be fully informed and, possibly, in writing, and only allowable if
the police have probable cause. Of course, if the police have probable cause to conduct
an outdoor search under the new approach, no consent will ever be necessary.
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ally shielded better from public viewing and overhearing (and thus
increases the caller's overall expectation of privacy), these distinc-
tions, while fine, are not irrational.
There are also questions that are unanswered in this formula-
tion--questions also unanswered in current law. For example, just
what sorts of technological intrusions will constitute a "search" and
what exigent circumstances will justify dispensing with the search
warrant requirement? Both of these questions, in my view, should
be answered case by case.
The most important issue, from the point of view of police and
civil libertarians alike, is whether a particular formulation provides
sufficiently clear guidance to the police so that inadvertent errors,
with their concomitant evidentiary exclusions, are better avoided
than in the present arrangement. As one prosecutor put it, "if the
Chief Justice of the United States sat in the back of a police car in
Manhattan [he could not] counsel the officer, within a degree of
legal certainty, on the constitutionality of a police action."1 60 The
Supreme Court itself admits that "our Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence has confused the courts."' 161
As I argue at length in The Failure of the Criminal Procedure Revolu-
tion, and as I hope the above formulation illustrates, a code, with its
capacity to anticipate problems in advance and to present rules in
concise form, would be the best approach. A code does not need to
account for precedent, and answers to questions can be obtained
quickly, rather than by poring over a series of long and often incon-
sistent cases, written by different Justices and different Courts over a
span of years.' 62 Still, even without a code, if the Court would
160 Harvey Levinson,Judges Can't Agree About Illegal Evidence N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1990,
at A14.
161 California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1990 (1991).
162 As further discussed in The Failure of the Criminal Procedure Revolution, clear, concise
rules are particularly important in criminal procedure law:
The day after a Supreme Court decision on searches incident to arrest, for example,
a thousand arrestees around the country are searched by police who have not even
heard of the Supreme Court opinion, much less received legal advice on how to
implement it. The next day, a thousand more arrestees are searched. ... [E]ven if
the police department has a legal adviser who circulates a memo explaining the
case, the chance that the police in the field will be able to understand and internal-
ize this latest nuance of the law of searches incident to arrest is nil. But, because all
criminal defendants receive counsel, even if they cannot afford to pay, most of these
searches that produce evidence will be litigated in a motion to suppress the evi-
dence that was found.
It is thus apparent that in the area of criminal procedure, unlike any other field
of Supreme Court endeavor, the doctrine must be clear, it must be complete, and it
must be stable. It is in these respects that criminal procedure law has failed.
BRADLEY, supra note 6, at 38-39.
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forthrightly adopt this two model approach to the Fourth Amend-
ment, as it largely has done sub silentio, and then enforce it consist-
ently, a surprisingly large number of Fourth Amendment problems
would evaporate.
